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Abstract: The remediation of contaminated sites is often subject to sub-
stantial cost overruns. This persistent discrepancy between estimated and
realized costs is chiefly responsible for misguided land use and wasteful delays
in the reconversion of former industrial sites. In order to deal with incomplete
information and uncertainty in this context, this paper draws on stochastic
modelling and mathematical finance methods. We show that relatively simple
and usable formulas can then be derived for better assessing cleanup strate-
gies. These formulas apply to generic remediation technologies and scenarios.
They are robust to misspecification of key parameters (like the eﬀectiveness
of a prescribed treatment). They also yield practical rules for decision making
and budget provisioning.
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“The Pentagon was so sloppy when calculating the cost of removing
perchlorate and other toxins from military sites that its estimate of
$16 billion to $165 billion is almost worthless, congressional investiga-
tors said Tuesday.” 1
1. Introduction
Over the last decades, the number of potentially contaminated sites in most developed
countries has grown to six or seven digits. In the European Union, more than 250,000 sites
are deemed to be contaminated and requiring remediation (Swartjes 2011). In the United
States, it is estimated that there are over 500,000 ‘brownfield’ sites in urban, suburban
and rural areas, and that their cleanup and redevelopment could cost more than $650
million (Bressler and Hannah 2000; Wernstedt et al. 2004).2 While some of these sites
might cover areas of several acres, most of them might only be ‘micro-sites’ of a few
squared-yards. But their sheer number and growing opportunity cost, the threats they
may pose to human health, wildlife, and land amenities, and the lasting stigma they can
put on certain locations, activities, industries, firms or even individuals have now brought
the matter on top of many policy makers’ and corporate boards’ agenda.
Dealing with contaminated sites raises a number of regulatory and business issues.
Many of them have been addressed over the last 40 years, and the researchers’ proposed
remedies have then often been implemented into eﬀective policies. Since insolvency and
1Lisa Friedman, “Report says cleanup cost miscaculated,” Los Angeles Daily News, June 28,
2004.
2The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines a brownfield as “an abandoned, idle or
underused industrial and commercial facility where expansion and redevelopment is complicated by real
or perceived environmental contamination.” As pointed out by an anonymous referee, the large number
of brownfield sites is mainly due to inadequate treatment of chemical liquids (such as oil) in the past
(e.g., in gas, chemical industry, heavy industry, dry-cleaning, and filling stations works). The growing
number of detected contaminated brownfield sites that was reported over the last three decades is to a
very large extent a result of gradual improvement and enhancement of investigation activities.
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limited liability often make it impossible to apply the polluter-pays principle, for instance,
it has been found that assigning some responsibility to lenders and other deep-pocket par-
ties up or down the value chain might contribute to set incentives right (see Alberini et al.
2005, and Hiriart and Martimort 2006, among others). Since the benefits of remediation
can be unclear, several works have developed rigorous benefit-assessment techniques (see
Swartjes 2011, Haninger et al. 2014, and the references therein). Since redevelopment
projects are frequently deterred by the perspective of unexpected costs and liability ex-
penses, two applied policy prescriptions are to preventively tax land users (which amounts
to enforcing precautionary savings on the implicated parties), as the Superfund Program
does in the United States, and to enhance risk sharing by the introduction of proper
insurance, financial and organizational means (see Yin et al. 2011, Zhang et al. 2012,
Medda et al. 2012, and Schroeder 2013, among many others). Coping with abandoned
sites and the diﬃculty to trace back contamination to its originator(s), however, remains a
major challenge for law makers. In the end, the eﬀectiveness of any public policy, market
remedy, insurance scheme or business plan inevitably depends on the reliability of cleanup
cost estimates. This paper focuses on this question.
The evaluation of remediation investments is routinely done using the traditional net-
present-value (NPV) method. A stylized example, taken from Zhang (2009, p. 1), illus-
trates the shortcomings of this approach.
Two strategies are compared: strategy one is to implement P&T (pump and
treat) for the entire decision time frame; strategy 2 is to implement PRB (per-
meable reactive barrier) for the entire decision time frame. The traditional
method will value these two strategies based on their respective cash flows:
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$10,000 per year for the former, $30,000 on year 1 and $1000 thereafter for
the latter. Assuming a discount rate of 5% and a five-year horizon, the NPV
of strategy 1 would be $45,460, whereas the NPV of the PRB strategy would
amount to only $33,546. However, it is not taken into account that one tech-
nology (here: P&T) might be more flexible than the other one (here: PRB)
if the conditions at the site develop diﬀerently than expected. What if the
concentration of pollutants after two years of P&T is low enough to switch
to a cheaper ($5000 a year) alternative like monitored natural attenuation
(MNA)? This would reduce the cost of strategy 1 to $32,492. Or what if P&T
turns out to meet the remediation target after only three years and can then
be stopped? The NPV of strategy 1 over three years would then amount to
$28,594, which is much lower than the cost of strategy 2.
Basically, by ignoring uncertainty, learning and adaptation, the NPV approach overlooks
the value of flexibility; it misses many contingency-based scenarios and might therefore
lead to making costlier decisions. This important general fact was emphasized some time
ago by Henry (1974) and Arrow and Fisher (1974). Herath and Park (2000; 2001) have
conveyed it further to engineering economists, applying the more recent machinery of ‘real
options’ put forward by Dixit and Pindyck (1994). The relevance of flexible strategies
when dealing with contaminated sites was then successively pointed out by Bage et al.
(2002, 2003), Wang and McTernan (2002), and Zhang (2009).
While the advantages of applying the logic of real options to site remediation projects
are now well-understood, usable methods that would make valuing flexible strategies
standard in practice are still lacking. To overcome this, and get operational means to
correctly assess the costs of contingent cleanup strategies, this paper draws from the
literatures on stochastic processes, mathematical finance and the theory of real options.
Specifically, our mathematical arguments borrow from the study of hitting times for a
geometric Brownian motion (see, e.g., Jeanblanc et al. (2004), and the references therein).
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The first part of this paper considers the estimation of remediation costs. This involves
the computation of the probability of being compliant (i.e., reaching a contamination level
that lies below the mandatory threshold) at various times including the required deadline
as well as each intermediate time where monitoring is required. The second part next
focuses on developing eﬀective rules for decision making and budget provisioning. This
requires the characterization of a decisional contamination threshold which allows to select
a remediation approach (and a corresponding budget) that would keep the probability of
not meeting the compliance deadline at an acceptable level.
These developments rely on somewhat involved mathematical tools. Yet, the obtained
formulas and strategies stick to the most common (software-based) probabilistic depic-
tions of contaminated sites and can be computed relatively easily (again using common
softwares, like Excel). The formula’s sensitivity to measurement errors or misspecification
of key parameters (like the eﬀectiveness of a chosen remediation technology) can also be
readily grasped.
The rest of this text unfolds as follows. In the upcoming section, we introduce the
notation and assumptions needed to represent typical remediation strategies. Section 3
next derives closed-form formulas for assessing the cost of such a strategy. These formulas’
robustness to parametric variations is examined in Section 4. Section 5 proposes a simple
systematic way to set a contingent (hence flexible) site remediation strategy based on
our formulas. Section 6 addresses the important practical matter of budget provisioning.
Some extensions are discussed in the concluding Section 7. All proofs are in the Appendix.
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2. The basic model
Consider a piece of land that has been characterized as contaminated. In this case,
some accountable entity - a private firm or a public body - has been identified. It must
now deploy eﬀective and aﬀordable means in order to comply with regulation within a
certain deadline. This situation can be modelled as follows.3
2.1 The decisionmaker’s information and regulatory constraints
Thanks to the site characterization report, the decision-making entity holds a reason-
ably accurate picture of the land’s contaminants, their respective properties, extent and
concentration, and the hazards they may thus pose to human health and the environment
(in view of the area’s specific location, geology, weather exposure, and current or antici-
pated use).4 This information supports a summary score 0 - concretely, a ‘risk index’ or
a soil ‘quality rating’ (Swartjes 2011, p. 33 and 49) - along with a forecast of this score’s
likely evolution as the contaminants get naturally dispersed or transform over time.
Taking stock of measurement errors and the eﬀect of random natural events (such
3 Two warnings are in order here. First, our model intends to be general, but most of the proce-
dures and technologies we mention below for concreteness apply mainly to soil remediation rather than
groundwater treatment (the two categories of intervention). Second, this section begins on what is of
course a highly stylized account of a real situation. ‘Site characterization’ is itself a complex process
which calls upon many types of scientific expertise (geochemistry, geohydrology, toxicology, biology, etc.)
and involves sophisticated multivariate and geostatistical tools (such as Kriging interpolation). As for
regulatory constraints, they are often the result of demanding tradeoﬀs and negotiations between stake-
holders (land owners, local residents, national and local public authorities, urban developers, scientists
and engineers, and even international institutions), which seek to strike a fine balance between economic
development and concerns about ecosystems and human health. For a more complete picture, see the
introduction and contributed chapters in Swartjes (2011).
4 There are thousands of listed contaminants. The most frequently encountered ones include metals
and metalloids (cadmium, lead, copper, zinc, arsenic, ...), non-metal inorganic substances (cyanides, ...),
aromatic hydrocarbons (benzene, toluene, ...), organic pollutants (polychlorinated biphenyls or PCBs,
chloroethylenes, ...), and petroleum hydrocarbons. For a standard classification of contaminants and
their respective health impacts, see Swartjes (2011).
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as weather conditions, rainfall, etc.), any score estimation would be non-deterministic;
concretely, a provided rating (now or in the future) may then be granted a margin which
follows a Normal distribution (Swartjes 2011, p. 37). For our modelling purposes, this
suggests that the evolution of the site’s score can be captured by the stochastic process
 = 0

0−22

+ (1)
or equivalently
 =  (0+ )
0 = 0 ,
(2)
where the index  ∈ [0∞) stands for time. This process, a geometric Brownian motion,
embodies (i) the site’s estimated capacity to naturally regenerate, through the average
rate of pollution decay 0  0, and (ii) the uncertainty surrounding the value of a stated
score at any time , through the random term  where  is a positive real number
and (;  ≥ 0) is a standard Brownian motion defined on a reference probability space
(ΩF P). The probability measure P formally represents the decision-maker’s beliefs
based on the available information; hence, letting E (·) denote mathematical expectations
under P, we have that E
³
0
´
= 0, which corresponds to the characterization report’s
prediction concerning the likely average evolution of the site’s contamination score.
All things considered (site characterization, environmental law, the stakeholders’ ex-
pressed preferences, etc.), the regulator deems any score above a certain threshold  to
be unacceptable. However, the site characterization report indicates that 0  . After
negotiations, the responsible entity is given a time span  to work on the site so the
measured contamination rating at the end of the period,  , would be such that  ≤ .
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Failure to comply will result in the entity having to pay a penalty , which we assume to
be proportional to the diﬀerence between  and  , i.e.
 = fine ( − )+ , (3)
where fine  0 may not only account for the tax inflicted by the regulator but also the
reputational stigma from violating the law, damaging nature, hurting the local residents’
property value, and endangering people’s health. For safety reasons, the regulator also
requires the entity to perform a number  of monitorings at some pre-specified times
1 = 1 2 =
2
   =

    =  . (4)
Each monitoring will cost a constant pre-agreed amount.5 Of course, as soon as the
mandated contamination level  is reached, remediation eﬀorts will stop. From now on,
we let   denote the first time the threshold  is hit, i.e.   = inf{   ≤ }.
2.2 Remediation technologies
The decision-making entity is now contemplating a set of technologies that could deal
with the problem.6 Whether a remediation technology is feasible or not, to begin with, de-
pends on the actual contaminants (a given treatment may be suitable for organic materials
but not for metals), the area’s relevant features (e.g., peculiar soil characteristics such as
texture, permeability, moisture content, etc.), the regulatory constraints, the technology’s
side eﬀects, and certain regulatory standards (‘landfarming’, for instance, which involves
thin spreading of excavated dirty soil, may be forbidden under some jurisdictions).
5 Site monitoring is often outsourced to a specialized firm subject to a fixed-price contract.
6 Kahn et al. (2004) provides an exhaustive overview of site remediation technologies, their respective
properties and some real-life applications, together with a valuable list of references. The technology
descriptions that follow draw without restraints from this article.
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Aside from feasibility, remediation technologies are also usually classified into two
distinct groups. The first subset includes what are called ‘ex situ’ technologies. These
approaches proceed by first excavating the contaminated soil and ship it elsewhere for
handling. Possible modes of treatment then include:
(d) Biopiles, which consist in stacking the contaminated soil and then boost
natural depollution processes using aeration or other devices;
(e) Incineration, where the contaminated soil is heated in order to release
petroleum waste and/or destroy organic contaminants.
Ex situ technologies are radical and eﬀective. Accordingly, and to simplify matters, let’s
assume that using one of these means will immediately bring the decision-making en-
tity into compliance. The downside, however, is that ex situ technologies are largely
irreversible and generally expensive.
The second group comprises what are called ‘in situ’ technologies. Contrary to the
above, an in situ approach requires no removal of soil material. Common examples are:
(a) Bioventing, which consists in injecting air into the contaminated media at
a rate designed to maximize biodegradation;
(b) Soil flushing, in which contaminated soil is flooded with a solution that
carries contaminants to a spot where they can be removed;
(c) Natural attenuation, which relies on natural processes to degrade contami-
nants, reduce their concentration, and/or bind them to the soil matrix so that
their spreading is retarded and/or reduced.7
7Note that the precise definition of natural attenuation may vary from country to country; in some
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In situ technologies are typically cheaper and more flexible.8 They can usually be com-
bined with or followed by other modes of treatment. But they require a longer time
horizon on average, and their outcome is uncertain. This suggests that, under an in situ
approach, the site contamination score will evolve according to the stochastic process
 =  (+ )
0 = 0 ,
(5)
where pollution decreases at a faster (but finite) mean rate  ≤ 0.9
Once the feasible remediation technologies and their respective properties are estab-
lished, the decisionmaker then needs to assess and compare the cost of diﬀerent cleanup
strategies. This issue is taken up in the next section.
3. Some cost assessment formulas
Two generic remediation strategies will now be considered: uninterrupted in situ re-
mediation, and interim in situ intervention followed by an ex situ approach. We shall
compute the expected cost of each strategy, assuming a constant discount rate .10 Other
decision criteria, dealing specifically with risk aversion, are indicated in the Conclusion.
3.1 Relying on an in situ technology
Suppose the decisionmaking entity chooses to proceed using only an in situ approach.
According to the experts, the selected technology has a mean eﬀectiveness rate given by .
cases, contaminants dilution is also included. We thank an anonymous referee for this remark.
8 There are exceptions of course, such as ‘vitrification’ - an in situ technique which aims to melt soil
or other earthen materials at extremely high temperatures (1600-2000 C), thereby immobilizing most
inorganic and destroying organic pollutants. But this confirms rather than invalidates our main point.
9 Equality holds here for natural attenuation.
10 This is without loss of generality. Allowing for a stochastic discount rate in the present framework
is equivalent to changing the reference probability measure (El Karoui et al. 1998).
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This strategy entails three types of expenses: (i) a fixed cost of implementation,  (),
to be paid initially, which might be close to 0 for natural attenuation and increase as the
eﬃciency parameter  grows in absolute value, (ii) the operational and monitoring cost
&1 () based on a constant total expected cost  incurred meanwhile the treatment
is applied (this cost comprises operational expenses related to, say, electricity to operate
pumps, chemicals to mix flushing solutions, etc., as well as the cost of monitoring the site
at the end of the period), and (iii) the penalty  defined by Equation (3). The present
value of penalties and total operational and monitoring expenditures are random numbers
given respectively by
&1 () = 
X
=1
−1 , and (6)
1 () = −fine ( − )× 1 . (7)
Let 1() be the total cost associated with this strategy, i.e.
1 () =  () + &1 () + 1 () . (8)
It is possible to obtain a closed form expression for this cost’s expected value. This
expression will use the following notation:
F− (  ) + Φ (2 (  ))−
³

0
´ 2(− 12 2)
2 × Φ (1 (  ))
F+ (  ) + Φ (2 (  ))−
³

0
´ 2(+12 2)
2 ×Φ (1 (  ))
where Φ refers to the standard Normal cumulative distribution function,
and 1 (  ) +
1
 ln
 
0

+(− 2)√ , 2 (  ) +
− 1 ln
 
0

+(− 2)√ .
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Proposition 1: The expected present value of the total cost associated with using an
in situ technology with mean eﬀectiveness rate  is given by:
E (1 ()) =  () + 
P
=1
−  F−
¡  ¢
+fine− ¡0F+ (−  )− F− (   )¢
This formula will prove useful for decision-making and budget provisioning, as Sections
5 and 6 below will show. It might look rather cumbersome, but it involves only standard
normal distributions and can thus be easily encoded. Quite intuitively, the value of
E (1 ()) decreases with the required contamination threshold  and goes up with the
operational costs  and the punishment .
3.2 Combining in situ and ex situ approaches
Suppose now that the decision-maker commits to treating the contaminated soil ex situ
after having applied an in situ technology with eﬀectiveness parameter  for  periods.
This strategy avoids paying the penalty . Its total cost 2 ( ) consists of (i) the initial
cost  () for implementing the in situ technology, (ii) the operational and monitoring
cost  incurred over the period    , and (iii) the implementation cost 2 ( ) of the
ex situ technology, that is:
2 ( ) =  () + &2 ( ) + 2 ( ) , (9)
where &2 ( ) is the total operational and monitoring cost given by
&2 ( ) = 
X
=1
− × 1 . (10)
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Let’s assume that the cost of an ex situ approach is proportional to the contamination
score at time ; this cost’s present value is then
2 ( ) = −ex situ × 1 (11)
where ex situ is a positive constant. A closed form expression for the expected total cost
in this case is again at hand.
Proposition 2: The expected present value of the total cost associated with a strategy
involving an ex situ approach that will take place after having used an in situ technology
of eﬀectiveness parameter  up to time  is given by:
E (2 ( )) =  ()+
X
=1
−  F−
µ
   
¶
+ex situ0−(−)F+ (− ) (12)
The expexted cost E (2 ( )) increases with  and ex situ, and decreases with the
mandatory contamination standard .
Examples of E (1 ()) and E (2 ( )) for diﬀerent values of  and  and selected
but fixed parameters , , and  are depicted in Figure 1. Both these expected costs
are convex and decreasing in |  | (i.e. as the situ technology becomes more eﬀective).
The latter also goes down when switching to an ex situ treatment is delayed (i.e. as 
increases). When the absolute value of  is low, combining in situ and ex situ approaches is
less expensive than relying on in situ treatment only; the reverse holds when the absolute
value of  is high. From now on, we shall assume this situation to hold.11
Insert Figure 1 about here.
Of course, a remediation strategy could be more complex than the one described here,
11 This will always be the case if operational and monitoring costs are not too large.
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involving, say, two in situ technologies (e.g., natural attenuation, then soil flushing) fol-
lowed by the excavation and incineration of the remaining contaminated soil. Provided
each remediation technology fits the assumptions made above, the approach which un-
derlies our propositions can handle these cases as well and generate similar formulas.
Indeed, as the Appendix shows, our assumptions allow to invoke a key lemma, shown in
Douady (1998) and Jeanblanc et al. (2004), which expresses the probability the random
time threshold   is greater than some given time  as the weighted diﬀerence of two
Normal cumulative distributions; computing expected costs formulas similar to the ones
in Propositions 1 and 2 is then straightforward.
Thanks to Propositions 1 and 2, the formulas’ sensitivity with respect to one essential
parameter - the predicted eﬀectiveness rate  of an in situ treatment - can readily be
assessed, as we will now see.
4. Robustness
Suppose now that, instead of ascribing a point estimate to the eﬀectiveness rate of
a given in situ technology, the decision-maker deems this rate  to lie between some
reasonable bounds  and . This belief may be based on laboratory tests, as well as the
information conveyed by the site characterization report. The next proposition then sets
an interval on the random total costs.
Proposition 3: Assume there exist two negative constants  and  such that −∞ 
 ≤  ≤   0. Then we have (i) 1 ¡¢ ≤ 1 () ≤ 1 () for a pure in situ intervention,
and (ii) 2 ¡ ¢ ≤ 2 ( ) ≤ 2 ( ) under a mixed in situ/ex situ approach.
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This result is rather strong, since it is written in terms of the random total costs
themselves, not in terms of their expected value. One important benefit is to allow better
forecasts of future expenses, hence better provisioning of financial, organizational and
technological resources. Provisioning is further addressed in Section 6.
The decision-making entity might also want to assess the cost diﬀerence from using
two distinct in situ techniques. Our next statement provides a bound on this diﬀerence
(this time, however, in expected values).
Proposition 4: Let ∗ and +, ∗  +, represent two in situ technologies’ respective
mean eﬀectiveness rate. Then:
i) If only in situ technologies are involved, for some constant  we have that
0 ≤ E [1 (∗)− 1 (+)] ≤ [ (∗)−  (+)] +  (∗ − +) + −fine(∗−+)
ii) And if an ex situ approach is deployed at time , for some constant  we have
0 ≤ E [2 ( ∗)− 2 ( +)] ≤ £ (∗)−  (+)¤+  (∗ − +) + −ex situ(∗−+)
The constants  and  summarize the bounds on the expectations, which are given
by some finite deterministic series (see the Appendix).
The accountable entity could use this result on at least two sorts of occasions. First,
for a number of reasons (e.g., social acceptability, local employment, technology transfers,
etc.), implementing the most eﬀective or the cheapest in situ technology could still be
questioned; while it may then be diﬃcult to assign monetary value to these additional
considerations, proposition 4 gives an order of magnitude for how great this value should
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be in order to compensate for the extra spending. Second, suppose that two subcon-
tractors are bidding for implementing the in situ treatment, each one proposing a distinct
approach; the latter inequalities oﬀer a way to judge whether the gap between bids is plau-
sible (a legitimate concern if the winning firm is going to operate under a cost-sharing
contract).
The above statements were obtained under predetermined cleanup strategies. Thanks
to these results, however, the next section will now address the design of such a strategy.
5. Contingent strategies
Suppose the site’s depollution has already begun using a given in situ technology with
eﬀectiveness rate . We shall now consider a rule that the decisionmaking entity could
use at any time  in order to decide whether or not to switch to an ex situ approach.
Since operational and monitoring expenses are often significant, and postponing the
eradication of contamination entails the provisioning of valuable resources, the account-
able entity may not want to pursue in situ treatment when the odds of succeeding are
low. This view can be expressed by holding a ‘tolerance level’ , 0    1, (which might
also embed the entity’s tolerance of risk, since the outcome from continuing the in situ
treatment is always uncertain) and a rule stipulating that
An ex situ approach is adopted whenever
the site’s score exceeds some dynamic trigger  defined as
 = max(  ) where  = inf { / P (     = ) ≥ } . (13)
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The rule thus asks to keep up with in situ treatment as long as meeting the regulator’s
demands at or before time  remains within acceptable sight in probabilistic terms, or
as long as the site’s current risk index  makes reaching the legal threshold  on time
suﬃciently likely (likelier than ).
The following technical assumption will prove useful in characterizing  .
Assumption: Let Φ denote the standard Normal cumulative distribution function.
Then Φ
µ−2
2
√

¶
≤  ≤ 05 .
The second inequality,  ≤ 05, seems reasonable, for a properly accountable entity would
hardly tolerate a large probability of being found noncompliant. As to the first inequality,
notice that  is negative, which implies that Φ
µ−2
2
√

¶
 05. Further justification
will come after the next proposition.
Proposition 5: For 0    1 and time    , the trigger  defined by (14) can be
written as
 = max[  exp
µ
√ − Φ−1 ()−
µ
− 
2
2
¶
( − )
¶
] (14)
As it can be seen more easily now, assuming that Φ
µ−2
2
√

¶
≤  ensures that
the coeﬃcient 0 in (13) is such that 0 ≥ . This condition seems natural: if it does
not hold, then 0 =  so an ex situ treatment should have been adopted right away.
Taking stock of proposition 5, one can now consider the behavior of the trigger 
as time elapses. The next figure illustrates the pattern for diﬀerent values of .12 As
12 We focus here on , as the decision-making entity should determine its tolerance level after the
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expected, when  gets smaller, so the accountable entity’s tolerance of failure decreases,
the subjective lower bound  for site contamination scores that would mandate a rad-
ical intervention goes down.13 Other observable features are formally stated in our last
proposition.
Insert Figure 2 about here.
Proposition 6: The decision trigger  has the following properties:
i)  =  ;
ii) it is decreasing in the current time  ;
iii) it is a convex function of the current time .
These attributes make the above decision rule rather sensible. Under this rule, compli-
ance is ultimately achieved (property i), and the pressure to switch to a fully dependable
ex situ treatment grows more and more as the deadline  looms (properties ii and iii).
As we shall now see, taking on such a trigger strategy additionally allows to handle
budget provisioning - an important practical matter - in a systematic fashion.
6. Budget provisioning
Before engaging in any remediation project, the responsible entity would normally
have to put aside some capital and build provisions. Suppose that she plans to use the
remediation strategy defined in the preceding section. Suitable provisions could then be
established as follows.
remediation technologies have been selected (so these technologies can be considered as given). Besides,
considering various values for the parameters  and  would yield the same qualitative pattern for  .
13The reader might observe that the values  = −02 and  = 03 used here diﬀer from the values
−09 ≤  ≤ −01 and  = 02 employed in Figure 1. The only reason is that it makes each graph as easy
to read as possible.
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Let b denote the monitoring time at which the in situ treatment is terminated
and replaced by an ex situ approach, i.e.b = inf { /  ∈ {0 1 2  } and  ≥  } .
If the probability of ever switching to an ex situ technology before time  is
lower than some predetermined level , i.e.
max∈{01−1} {P (b = )}   ,
the decisionmaking entity should make provisions according to the expected
cost  (1 ()) of using a pure in-situ technology. Otherwise, she should set
set aside an amount min (2 ( )) corresponding to the cheapest mixed
remediation strategy.
Thanks to the above results, computing the needed probabilities P (b = ) turns out
to be relatively tractable. Indeed, for  = 0, either 0  0 and then P (b = 0) = 0 or
0 ≥ 0 and then P (b = 0) = 1.
For  = 1, we have P (b = 1) = P ¡0  0 ∩ 1 ≥ 1¢. When 0  0 , this expression
becomes
P (b = 1) = P ¡1 ≥ 1¢ = Φ ¡− ¡1 1¢¢
with
 ¡1 1¢ = ln
10 −
³
− 2
2
´
1
√1
For  = 2, the probability P (b = ) can be written as
P (b = 2) = P ¡0  0 ∩ 1  1 ∩ 2 ≥ 2¢
If 0  0 , then
P (b = 2) = P ¡2 ≥ 2 |1  1¢P ¡1 ≥ 1¢ = P ¡2 ≥ 2 |1  1¢Φ ¡ ¡1 1¢¢
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and
P
¡2 ≥ 2 |1  1¢
=
1Z
0
P
¡2 ≥ 2|1  1¢  ( (1)) 
=
1Z
0
1√
2P
µ
 exp
µµ
− 
2
2
¶
(2 − 1) +  (2 −1)
¶
≥ 2
¶
exp
Ã
− (1)
2
2
!

=
1Z
0
1√
2Φ ( (1 2 )) exp
Ã
− (1)
2
2
!

where  is the density function of the standard Normal distribution, and
 (1 2 ) = ln

+

−2
2

(+1)−Φ−1()√−2
√2−1 (replacing 2 by its explicit value)
 (1) = ln

0−

−2
2

1
√1
Hence,
P (b = 2) =
1Z
0
1√
2Φ ( (1 2 )) exp
Ã
− (1)
2
2
!
 ×Φ ¡ ¡1 1¢¢
The general case  ≥ 3 is handled in the Appendix.
7. Concluding remarks
Around the world, policymakers, regulators, land owners, local communities, industrial
firms, insurance companies, etc. have to deal with the remediation of contaminated sites.
One important hurdle is that cleaning up a contaminated site is often subject to significant
cost uncertainties. This paper’s motivation was to cope with this issue. Drawing on
studies of random hitting times carried out in mathematical finance and real-options
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theory, we computed closed-form tractable expressions for assessing the expected cost of
cleanup strategies, and derived simple rules for selecting remediation technologies and
provisioning financial resources.
Several extensions of this study appear to be natural at this stage.
First, while the rules we examined look rather reasonable and applicable, these rules
were not shown to be optimal. Seeking the best decision in the present framework would
constitute a nontrivial and certainly worthwhile exercise in stochastic optimization. The
obtained solution would then have to be compared with the above rules, both analytically
and/or through simulations.
Secondly, although the decisionmaker’s risk aversion could somewhat be captured by
the ‘tolerance’ thresholds introduced in Sections 5 and 6, more precise ways to represent
risk aversion can be called for. One should then turn to other decision criteria, such as a
mean-variance criterion or some of the convex risk measures developed in mathematical
finance (see, e.g., Artzner et al. 1999).
Third, as the ultimate test for the current propositions and their possible extensions
lies in their concrete application, one would want to see the approach outlined in this pa-
per implemented in algorithms and softwares. A related complementary challenge would
also be to understand better how our cleanup cost assessment method might aﬀect reme-
diation management projects overall, through changing stakeholders’ perceptions, say, or
impacting negotiations with the regulator.
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APPENDIX
To start with, let us state a general result that is essential for computing the formulas
in Propositions 1 and 2.
Lemma: Let ()≥0 and
¡ ¢≥0 be the processes defined respectively by  = +
and  = inf { 0 ≤  ≤ }. For  ≤ 0, we have
P
¡ ≥ ¢ = Φµ− + √
¶
− 2Φ
µ + √
¶
where Φ is the standard Normal cumulative distribution function: Φ () = 1√
2
R
−∞
− 22 
Proofs can be found in Douady (1998) or Jeanblanc et al. (2004).
Proof of Proposition 1:
Since
P
¡    ¢ = P [inf { 0 ≤  ≤ }  ]
= P
h
inf
©¡
 − 2
¢ + 0 ≤  ≤ ª  1 ln³ 0´i ,
and   0 by assumption, the Lemma entails that:
P
¡    ¢ = Φ
⎛
⎝
− 1 ln
³

0
´
+
¡
 − 2
¢ 
q


⎞
⎠
−
µ
0
¶ 2(− 122)
2 × Φ
⎛
⎝
1
 ln
³

0
´
+
¡
 − 2
¢ 
q


⎞
⎠
Hence,
E
¡&1 ()¢ =  X
=1
−  
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
Φ
µ− 1 ln 0 +(−2 )  √ 
 
¶
−
³

0
´ 2(− 122)
2 ×Φ
µ
1
 ln
 
0

+(−2 )  √ 
 
¶
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
22
Moreover,
P
¡    ¢ = P hinf ©¡ − 2¢ + 0 ≤  ≤ ª  1 ln³ 0´i
= P
h
inf
©¡
 +

2
¢ +   0 ≤  ≤ ª  1 ln³ 0´i ,
where the probability measure P is equivalent to P and is defined by the Radon-Nikodym
derivative P
P
¯¯¯¯
F = 
− 122
and where the process   =  −  is a P-Brownian motion. Thanks again to the
Lemma, we obtain
P−
¡    ¢ = Φ
⎛
⎝
− 1 ln
³

0
´
+
¡
 +

2
¢√
⎞
⎠
−
µ
0
¶2(+122)
2 × Φ
⎛
⎝
1
 ln
³

0
´
+
¡
 +

2
¢√
⎞
⎠
Formula (9) now follows from the fact that
E
h
 × 1
i
= 0P ¡    ¢
and
E
¡1 ()¢ = E hfine− ( − )× 1 i
= fine−E
h
 × 1
i
− fine−P ¡    ¢ ¥
Proof of Proposition 2:
Using the same line of arguments as in the previous derivation, the expected present
value of turning to incineration at time at time  can be expressed as
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E
¡2 ( )¢ = ex situE h− × 1 i = ex situ0−(−)P ¡    ¢
= ex situ−(−)
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
Φ
µ− 1 ln 0 +(+2 )√ ¶
−
³

0
´ 2(+122)
2 ×Φ
µ
1
 ln
 
0

+(+

2 )√
¶
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
And the expected operational and monitoring costs are similarly given by
E
¡&2 ( )¢ =  X
=1
−E
³
1
´
= 
X
=1
−  
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
Φ
µ− 1 ln 0 +(−2 )  √ 
 
¶
−
³

0
´ 2(− 122)
2 × Φ
µ
1
 ln
 
0

+(−2 )  √ 
 
¶
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ ¥
Proof of Proposition 3:
) Notice that the function14   is non-decreasing in  and so are the functions 1
and 1 . As
1 () =  () + 
X
=1
−1 + −fine ( − )× 1 ,
the function 1 () is also non-decreasing in . Hence the result.
) The functions   and  () are non-decreasing in . Therefore, the desired result is
obtained from the equality
2 ( ) =  () + 
X
=1
− × 1 + −ex situ × 1 ¥
14The dependency in  of this function and the subsequent functions is not explicitely indicated, but
comes from the process  .
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Proof of Proposition 4:
For  = 1 2, we denote by   the solution of the stochastic diﬀerential equation
  =   (+ ) ,  0 = 0 .
i) Technology in situ
The diﬀerence 1 (1)− 1 (2) consists of the following three terms :
1 (1)− 1 (2) =  (1)−  (2)
+ P
=1
−
h
1 1 − 1 2
i
+− fine
h
( 1 − )× 1 1 − ( 2 − )× 1 2
i
Let us first consider the second term  P
=1
−
h
1 1 − 1 2
i
From 1  2 we get
0 ≤  P
=1
−
h
1 1 − 1 2
i
≤  P
=1
−1 2  1
Hence
E
µ
 P
=1
−
h
1 1 − 1 2
i¶
≤  P
=1
−P
³
  2      1
´
We have
P
³
  2      1
´
= P
³¡1 − 1
2
2¢   ln³ 0´−   ¡2 − 122¢ ´
= P
⎛
⎝
ln
³

0
´
− ¡1 − 1
2
2¢ 
√ 
√ 
ln
³

0
´
− ¡2 − 1
2
2¢ 
√
⎞
⎠
=
1√
2 ×
(2)Z
(1)
−22 
with  ( ) =
ln
³

0
´
− ¡− 1
2
2¢ 
√  From this we deduce
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E
µ
 P
=1
−
h
1 1 − 1 2
i¶
≤ √
2
P
=1
−
(2)Z
(1)
−22 
≤ √
2
P
=1
− ((2 )− (1 ))
≤  (
1 − 2)
√2
P
=1
−√
Now, since the sum
P
=1
−√ does not depend on ,  = 1 2, we can assert that
there exists a constant  that only depends on  and such that
E
Ã

X
=1
−
h
1 1 − 1 2
i!
≤  ¡1 − 2¢
We now consider the third term +− fine
h
( 1 − )× 1 1 − ( 2 − )× 1 2
i
From 1  2 we deduce
0 ≤ ( 1 − )× 1 1 − ( 2 − )× 1 2 ≤  1 −  2
and therefore
E
³
− fine
h¡ 1 − ¢× 1 1 − ¡ 2 − ¢× 1 2 i´ ≤ − fine(1−2)
ii) Technology ex situ
The diﬀerence 2 (1)− 2 (2) consists of three terms as follows :
 () +  P
=1
− × 1 + − ex situ × 1
2 (1)− 2 (2) =  (1)−  (2)
+ P
=1
−
h
1 1 − 1 2
i
+−ex situ
h
 1 × 1 1 −  1 × 1 1
i
and the proof is similar to the previous one. ¥
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Proof of Proposition 5:
We focus on the characterization of
 = inf { / P (     = ) ≥ }
The inequality P (     = ) ≥  can be written on the form P
³
   
´
≥ 
where   =  exp
µµ
− 
2
2
¶
( − ) +  ( −)
¶
Thus
P
³
   
´
= P
⎛
⎝ 
ln  −
³
− 2
2
´
( − )
√ − 
⎞
⎠ where  ∼  (0 1)
and therefore
P
³
   
´
= P (     ≥ ) ≥  ⇐⇒ Φ
µ
ln
+

−2
2

(−)
√−
¶
≥ 
⇐⇒ ln
 +

−2
2

(−)
√− ≥ Φ−1 ()
We finally get ln
 +
³
− 2
2
´
( − )
√ −  ≥ Φ
−1 ()
and the desired result. ¥
Proof of Proposition 6:
i) This condition follows immediately from Equation (14).
ii) Let us first recall that
 =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
 if   
 otherwise
where  =  exp
¡√ − +  ( − )¢. Let  () be defined as
 () = { /  =  }
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Obviously,  () = © / √ − +  ( − )  0ª and from this, we get that the map  ∈
 ()→  is decreasing with respect to the current time . Therefore, the same property
of decreasing monotonicity holds for  .
iii) The sign of the second derivative 
22 is that of
³

2
√− + 
´2 − 
4(−)√− . Now
for  in  () we haveµ 
2
√ −  + 
¶2
− 
4 ( − )√ −  
µ 
2
√ −  −
√ − 
¶2
− 
4 ( − )√ − 
=
2
4 ( − ) −

4 ( − )√ −  =
 ¡√ − − 1¢
4 ( − )√ −   0
Hence,  ∈  ()→  is convex and therefore,  is also convex. ¥
Computing P (b = ):
For  ≥ 3, one can use the following general argument
P (b = )
= P
¡0  0 ∩ 1  1 ∩ 2  2 ∩  ∩ −1  −1 ∩  ≥ ¢
= P
Ã
 ≥  |
−1\
=0
  
!
P
Ã−1\
=0
  
!
= P
¡ ≥  |−1  −1¢P
Ã−1\
=0
  
!
Provided that 0  0 , the latter writes
P (b = ) = PÃ ≥  | −1\
=1
  
!
P
Ã−1\
=1
  
!
= P
¡ ≥  |−1  −1¢P
Ã−1\
=1
  
!
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Moreover,
P
Ã−1\
=1
  
!
= P
Ã
−1  −1 |
−2\
=1
  
!
P
Ã−2\
=1
  
!
= P
¡−1  −1 | −2  −2¢P
Ã−2\
=1
  
!
Therefore,
P (b = ) = P ¡ ≥  |−1  −1¢ −1Y
=2
P
³
   | −1  −1
´
We need then to compute the various conditional expectations
P
¡ ≥  |−1  −1¢
=
−1Z
0
P
¡ ≥  |−1 = ¢  ( (−1)) 
=
−1Z
0
1√
2P
µ
 exp
µµ
− 
2
2
¶
( − −1) +  ¡ −−1¢¶ ≥ ¶ exp
Ã
− (−1)
2
2
!

=
−1Z
0
1√
2Φ ( (−1  )) exp
Ã
− (−1)
2
2
!

where, as previously introduced,  is the standard Normal density function, Φ is the
standard Normal cumulative distribution function and15
 (−1  ) = ln

+

−2
2

(+−1)−Φ−1()√−
√−−1
 (−1) = ln

0−

−2
2

−1
√−1
15In the first expression, we replace  by its explicit value.
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Moreover for any  ≥ 2 we have:
P
³
   | −1  −1
´
=
−1Z
0
P
¡   |−1 = ¢  ( (−1)) 
=
−1Z
0
1√
2Φ (− (−1  )) exp
Ã
− (−1)
2
2
!
 ¥
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